


From Prey to Predator: A Use Case for Using Active Defense to Reshape the Asymmetrical Balance in Cyber Defense

Pei-Yu Huang, Washington University in St. Louis

Yi-Ting Huang, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology

Yea li Sun, National Taiwan University

Meng Chang Chen, Academia Sinica





Outline

- Main Idea
- Background & Related Work
- Use Case
- Proposed Active Defense Implementations
- Conclusion
- Future Work
- Q & A



Outline

- Main Idea
- Background & Related Work
- Use Case
- Proposed Active Defense Implementations
- Conclusion
- Future Work
- Q & A



Main Idea

- Cyber-security defenses predominantly rely on a **passive** approach of waiting for adversaries to match predefined rules.
- Active defense involves actively engaging with adversaries to **observe, affect, and elicit** attack behaviors by providing deceptive information.
- We analyzed the TTPs used in a real-world cyber-attack based on the MITRE ATT&CK® framework.
- Then, using the identified TTPs and mapped to the MITRE Engage™ framework, we **identified potential use cases for implementing active defense** as a countermeasure.



Outline

- Main Idea
- Background & Related Work
- Use Case
- Proposed Active Defense Implementations
- Conclusion
- Future Work
- Q & A


What is Active Defense?

With traditional “passive” defense,
the attacker only needs to be
right once



- ✓ Secure Perimeters
- ✗ Secure Internal Network
- ✗ The IP and data within the domain are genuine, and once they are stolen, the attacker wins

Under active defense techniques, the
attacker only needs to be
wrong once



- ✓ Secure Perimeters
- ✓ Secure Internal Network
- ✓ Not all IPs and data are genuine. Once stolen, there is **no guarantee** that the attacker wins



Components of Active Defense

- **Cyber Denial**

- **Prevent or impair** the adversary's ability to conduct operations
- **Limit** their movements and collection efforts
- **Diminish the effectiveness** of their capabilities.

- **Cyber Deception**

- Intentionally **reveal deceptive facts** and **fictions** to **mislead** the adversary
- **Conceal critical facts** and **fictions** to prevent the adversary from taking appropriate actions




Active Defense (Adversary Engagement)

- Cyber denial + Cyber deception
- **Negatively impact the adversary**
 - To **expose** adversaries on the network
 - To **elicit** intelligence to learn more about their attack Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
 - To **affect** the adversary by **impacting** their ability to operate

What can Active Defense do?


Reduce attackers' accuracy in distinguishing between genuine and fake systems.




Increase the chance of detecting intrusion in real-time.



Increase the time and cost required for attackers and add complexity.



Even if deception are not actually deployed, **as long as attackers believe there are**, desired effect can still be achieved.



Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation
10 techniques	8 techniques	9 techniques	14 techniques	19 techniques	13 techniques

Tactics

Procedure Examples

TeamTNT has scanned specific lists of target IP addresses.

Active Scanning (3)

Techniques

With the identified TTPs from ATT&CK framework, we can then map what active defense to use from Engage framework.



MITRE Engage Framework

MITRE Engage™

Home

Tools ▾

Why Engage? ▾

Engage with Us ▾



Prepare	Expose		Affect			Elicit	Understand	
Plan	Collect	Detect	Prevent	Direct	Disrupt	Reassure	Motivate	Analyze
Cyber Threat Intelligence	API Monitoring	Introduced Vulnerabilities	Baseline	Attack Vector Migration	Isolation	Application Diversity	Application Diversity	After-Action Review
Engagement Environment	Network Monitoring	Lures	Hardware Manipulation	Email Manipulation	Lures	Artifact Diversity	Artifact Diversity	Cyber Threat Intelligence
Gating Criteria	Software Manipulation	Malware Detonation	Isolation	Introduced Vulnerabilities	Network Manipulation	Burn-In	Information Manipulation	Threat Model
Operational Objective	System Activity Monitoring	Network Analysis	Network Manipulation	Lures	Software Manipulation	Email Manipulation	Introduced Vulnerabilities	
Persona Creation			Security Controls	Malware Detonation		Information Manipulation	Malware Detonation	
Storyboarding				Network Manipulation		Network Diversity	Network Diversity	
Threat Model				Peripheral Management		Peripheral Management	Personas	
				Security Controls		Pocket Litter		
				Software Manipulation				

5 Goals

9 Approaches

31 Activities

Denial

Deception



MITRE ATT&CK Framework

Tactic	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution
	Establish Accounts	Phishing	User Execution
Technique	Obtain Capabilities	Exploit Public-Facing Application	System Services

MITRE Engage Framework

Goal	Expose	Affect	Elicit	
Approach	Collect	Direct	Reassure	Motivate
Activity	System Activity Monitoring	Email Manipulation	Pocket Litter	Personas
			Email Manipulation	




Outline

- Main Idea
- Background & Related Work
- **Use Case**
- Proposed Active Defense Implementations
- Conclusion
- Future Work
- Q & A



Use Case: Cybersecurity Incident at CPC Taiwan

- In May 2020, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC) in Taiwan, a natural gas corporation, fell victim to a ransomware.
- Disrupted electronic transaction applications for half a month.
- A targeted attack on **Active Directory (AD)**
- We analyzed the tactics and techniques used in this incident based on the ATT&CK framework, and we identify possible active defense implementations based on the Engage framework.



(1) Initial Access

- T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1566: Phishing

(2) Command and Control (C2)

- T1021: Remote Services
- T1071: Application Layer Protocol

(3) Discovery

- T1049: System Network Connections Discovery
- T1018: Remote System Discovery
- T1016.001: System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- T1046: Network Service Discovery

(3) Credential Access & Collection

- T1550: Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1056: Input Capture

(4) Persistence & Privilege Escalation

- T1053.003: Scheduled Task/Job

(4) Impact

- T1486: Data Encrypted for Impact



Outline


- Main Idea
- Background & Related Work
- Use Case
- **Proposed Active Defense Implementations**
- Conclusion
- Future Work
- Q & A



Initial Access: Exploiting Web Server

- Application Diversity

- Mixes **decoy web servers** that mimics the legitimate server



- Network Manipulation

- Decoy web server interacts with the adversary and alert the security team



- Introduced Vulnerabilities


- **Redirect** the adversary from the real server and gather information about their capabilities and resources
 - **Reveal** targeting preferences, available capabilities, or even to influence future targeting decisions






Discovery

- Software Manipulation
 - **Decoy Endpoint**
 - **Decoy AD**



- Pocket Litter

- Decoys provides fake information, such as IP addresses and domain account names




- Network Manipulation


- Install a module at the endpoints that monitor any scans directed to a **closed port**
- Scans sent to a non-existent device or service are deemed suspicious



Decoy Endpoint: Obfuscating Ports Scans



Decoy AD: Active Directory Intercept on endpoint





Credential Access & Collection

- Information Manipulation

- Place fake credentials

- Usernames, passwords, and access keys by extracting password hash from either memory or hard disks (e.g., account manager or password/shadow file).

Elicit	
Reassure	Motivate

- Security Controls

- Alter security controls to make the system **more or less vulnerable** to attack.
- **Modifying** Group Policies, disabling or enabling autorun for remote administration, tightening or relaxing system firewalls.

Affect	
Prevent	Direct

- Pocket Litter

- Browsing history, pictures, installed software, and connection history.
- Decoy files **mixed** with non-essential real files and encrypted using base64 or Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

Elicit
Reassure



Impact- The last resort

- Artifact Diversity


- Display various system artifacts, such as browser cookies, directories.
- Any decoy files are modified means that ransomware has been executed.

Elicit	
Reassure	Motivate

- Information Manipulation

- Redirected to a VM and isolated from the system network.
- The VM would contain decoy files, such as .doc, .xlsx, .pdf, and .mp4, are included, **exceeding the quantity of actual files by one hundred times.**
- Slow down encryption rate and create the appearance that it is still carrying out its intended function.

Elicit	
Reassure	Motivate



Initial Access

- EAC0006: Application Diversity
- EAC0016: Network Manipulation
- EAC0023: Introduced Vulnerabilities

Discovery

- EAC0011: Pocket Litter
- EAC0014: Software Manipulation
- EAC0016: Network Manipulation

Credential Access & Collection

- EAC0011: Pocket Litter
- EAC0015: Information Manipulation
- EAC0018: Security Controls

Impact

- EAC0015: Information Manipulation
- EAC0022: Artifact Diversity



Outline

- Main Idea
- Background & Related Work
- Use Case
- Proposed Active Defense Implementations
- **Conclusion**
- Future Work
- Q & A



Conclusion

- With CPC's APT attack scenario, we examined attack techniques employed based on ATT&CK framework.
- We proposed various active defense strategies utilizing denial and deception techniques based on Engage framework.
- Active defense **enhances the overall security posture of the internal network.**
- Active Defense is still a relatively novel concept, but the adoption of engagement, denial, and deception by the defensive side is undoubtedly becoming a prominent future trend.



Outline

- Main Idea
- Background & Related Work
- Use Case
- Proposed Active Defense Implementations
- Conclusion
- **Future Work**
- Q & A



Future Work

- Currently, we are working with Acer on the implementations
 - Interface
 - Report systems
- Gathering real-life data to evaluate the effectiveness of the implementations.
- Further research would focus on **resource requirements**, operational overheads, and potential scalability challenge.



Q & A

Contact info:

Pei Yu, Huang h.peiyu@wustl.edu


Yi-Ting Huang ythuang@mail.ntust.edu.tw



Thank you!



Appendix



Initial Access: Phishing Attack

- EAC0009: Email Manipulation
 - **Decoy emails** are placed on orphan pages
 - When decoy emails receive any messages, block the associated email addresses and IPs to prevent employees from viewing them.
- EAC0012: Persona
 - A **fake employee profile** on a social media platform like LinkedIn, complete with a decoy email address.
- EAC0011: Pocket Litter
 - Hobbies, personal, professional interactions, profile data, and updates



Appeared as Linux OS with SSH open for connection

192.168.1.55 - 遠端桌面連線

allen@kali: ~

The programs included with the Kali GNU/Linux system are free software; the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Kali GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by applicable law.

Last login: Fri Dec 23 22:48:08 2022 from 10.1.2.1

(allen@kali)-[~]

\$ nmap -sV -p 22 192.168.1.55

Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-12-26 15:12 CST

Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.55

Host is up (0.0019s latency).

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION
22/tcp	open	ssh	OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.74 seconds

Windows PC
without SSH
connection



Severity	Attack Phase	Timestamp	Attacker	Service	Target IP	Target OS	Description	Interface
Very High	Deceptive Credentials	15:24:02 01-18-2023	192.168.1.55 (55-Attivo Client.orange.com.tw)	WINLOGON	192.168.1.65 (AttivoDC.orange.com.tw)	Windows 2012-64	Deceptive Credential Usage (Windows Logon Success : WinEvtLog; 2023 Jan 18 07:23:58 WinEvtLog: Security: AUDIT_SUCCESS(4624): Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing: (no user): no domain: Windows2012-64.attivo.com: An account was successfully logged on. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-18 Account Name: Windows2012-64\$ Account Domain: attivo Logon ID: 0x3E7 Logon Type: 10 Impersonation Level: Impersonation New Logon: Security ID: S-1-5-21-1119950612-2432843808-2512486669-1106 Account Name: attivoadmin Account Domain: attivo Logon ID: 0x5D8EDB Logon GUID: {4E3F0FA8-8976-5FFE-F99C-71D5E1170E31} Process Information: Process ID: 0x724 Process Name: C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\WINLOGON.EXE Network Information: Workstation Name: Windows2012-64 Source Network Address: 192.168.1.55 Source Port: 0 Detailed Authentication Information: Logon Process: User32 Authentication Package: Negotiate Transited Services: - Package Name (NTLM only): - Key Length: 0 This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed. The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe)	



Potential Utilized **Attack Techniques**

